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Abstract This paper introduces some new features in the standard experimental
design of the beauty contest in order to allow communication among participants.
With that aim, we use the mode instead of the mean and non-rival payoffs. This
design encourages students to communicate their guessed number, with a higher
probability if subjects know the 0 Nash equilibrium. The lack of communication
can only be explained by subjects endowed with competitive other-regarding pref-
erences. Experiments are run in 11 classrooms ranging from 11 to 60 students in
size. Participants are given at least one week to submit their guesses and a ques-
tionnaire explaining their choice. Results indicate that: i) communication induces
coordination in the responses, ii) communication does not guarantee any improve-
ment in the average reasoning level, iii) there exist significative differences accord-
ing to classroom size and duration of degree.
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1 Introduction
Over the last decade, the Beauty Contest Game (BCG hereafter) has been success-
fully used as an experimental tool in Economics. Despite its seemingly ex-ante
complexity, it turns out to be an interesting game to study how subjects learn spe-
cific rules due to its ex-post simplicity.
BCG is a simple guessing game that facilitates the evaluation of individuals’
level of reasoning. The basic BCG is as follows: a certain number of subjects are
invited to play a game in which all of them must simultaneously choose a number
from an interval (generally [0,100]). The winner is the player whose number is
closest to p-times the mean of all the numbers chosen, where 0 < p < 1. The win-
ner (one of them if there are several) receives a fixed prize, the losers get nothing.
In an attempt to understand how people solve this game, two basic theoretical
explanations can be given: the iterative elimination of dominated strategies and
best response behavior. Empirical evidence provided by many experimental inves-
tigations [see for example Nagel, 1995, Ho et al., 1998, Bosch-Dome`nech et al.,
2002] suggests that: i) few people know the zero solution (the Nash equilibrium),
ii) the answers are widely spread on the interval and, iii) the average reasoning
level rarely exceeds three iterations.
Since the main purpose of prior experimental research has been to study how
many iterated levels subjects actually apply, BCG experiments are often run with
isolated individuals. However, in real life situations people do not make decisions
in an isolated setting such as a laboratory. Instead, they communicate among them-
selves, exchange their opinions and then make decisions. Therefore, many deci-
sions are made in coordination with other individuals.
This paper addresses a new issue: how communication among subjects affects
BCG findings. In our investigation, we let students communicate with one another
before eliciting their choices in classroom experiments.
Given the peculiarities of BCG, the communication factor is not simple to im-
plement. Effective communication requires giving the right incentives so people
will say their true guessed numbers and coordinate with one another to come up
with a single answer. For example, if the payoffs are rival, letting subjects commu-
nicate with each other may not be enough.
Consider the following example to illustrate the problem of incentives to in-
duce communication in our context:
John, Adam and Peter’s father proposes that they play the following game:
if at least two (the mode) of them say the same supermarket name, then the
father will buy one coke for each winning son; if not, he will choose one
randomly and will buy him a coke.
What will John, Adam and Peter do? If it is a simultaneous game1 with pre-
communication, the three brothers will say some names of supermarkets (strate-
gies) and will try to coordinate at one of them. Assuming rationality (self-interest)
1 Coordination is immediate in a sequential game. If John, for example, chooses strategy
A first, then Adam will also select strategy A to coordinate. Consequently, if Peter wants to
get the coke, he should choose the same strategy as his brothers.
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and zero communication costs, the best response is the truth-telling strategy, that
is, tell your opponent the strategy that you are going to use. If, in contrast, the
communication costs are high, coordination may be difficult to achieve.
But even with costless communication, why would one of the brothers not be
informed about the true strategy chosen by the others? It is obvious that two people
are sufficient enough to constitute a winning coalition. Assume that both partners
consider not only their own payoffs, but also their outsider brother’s payoff in their
utility function. This last argument affects their preferences negatively in the sense
that they prefer their brother not to get the coke. That is, subjects are endowed with
other-regarding preferences, which are not altruistic a la Fehr and Schmidt [1999],
but envious, as these individuals like advantageous inequality.
What would happen if the number of brothers was very large, for example 15,
and the winners were those who choose the most voted option? Either you get
great pleasure from inequality or you will try to convince everybody (the more the
better) that your strategy is the best or the most popular or use any other argument
to increase your chances of winning. In this case, inequality-seeking would be the
sole reason for not giving someone the relevant information (if communication
costs are zero).
Therefore, in order to achieve this communication effect, we modify the game
in two ways: 1) the mode instead of the mean is used as the order statistic and 2)
non-rival payoffs are given. This means that the winner will be the person whose
number is the closest to p-times the mode and all winners will get a fixed prize.
Why use the mode? Because we are looking for collusive behavior among
students. When the mode is the reference, they have a clear incentive to coordinate:
the larger the coalition the greater the probability of winning. This variation is an
extension on the existing experimental literature on BCG.
It is important to highlight the fact that we use non-rival payoffs. This is be-
cause we are interested not only in analyzing self-interest behavior (the absolute
position), but also the relative position in the group (other-regarding preferences).
Let us suppose a weak equilibrium that is different from zero2 . Under non-rival
payoffs, we would find coordination at any number different from zero only in
the case in which students are concerned solely about their own marks. In con-
trast, individuals endowed with competitive3 other-regarding preferences would
not communicate their true choice and betray the coalition (at a number different
from zero).
Moreover, if any rational student knows the theoretical solution of the game,
that is 0, she should communicate it to everyone to avoid the possible trembling-
hand problem. Note that any weak equilibrium (even with non-rival payoffs) may
suffer from hand trembling.
The experiments were run in 11 sessions held on the same day at the University
of Jae´n, Spain. All of them were conducted in the classroom by the same professor.
2 Any number in the interval could be a weak equilibrium if all subjects choose the same
number and they show self-interest behavior.
3 Note that with rival payoffs the incentives to betray the coalition are obvious.
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After the sessions, participants were asked to fill in a short questionnaire to shed
some light on how they had reached the chosen number.
As we will see below, COMMUNICATION gives rise to a spectacular result:
most of the guessed numbers are concentrated in one single number, that is, there
is COORDINATION. However, this number is not always the Nash equilibrium.
The statistical analysis, using meta-analysis, provides us with an interesting expla-
nation for these discrepancies: sometimes, although the proportion of subjects who
know the theoretical solution is quite low, they communicate it to everybody and
coordination at zero is produced. Other times, however, there is a high percentage
of individuals who know the right answer but do not communicate it, that is, there
exists COMPETITIVE other-regarding preferences.
This paper is structured as follows: the theoretical and experimental research
on BCG is summarized in the next section, while the experimental design and
procedures are described in detail in the third section. In the fourth section, the
principal results are presented and the data is analyzed using an innovative statis-
tical technique in experimental economics: meta-analysis. Lastly, conclusions are
reached in section five.
2 The beauty contest game: theoretical and experimental background
The original idea behind the BCG was first mentioned by Keynes [1936] in an
attempt to express that a clever investor has to “anticipate the basis of conventional
valuation a few months hence, rather than . . . over a long term of years” (pg. 155)
so he can act in the stock market before other investors do. As explained in the
introduction, the formal game model was introduced by Moulin [1986].
In the standard game (0< p< 1, mean), the unique Nash equilibrium is 0. This
solution can be reached two ways: i) by a best-response argument and ii) by the
iterated elimination of dominated strategies.
Best response may be summarized as follows. Given that each subject has to
submit a number between 0 and 100, the distribution of the chosen numbers lets
us analyze the depth of reasoning of the population. Following Stahl [1996], we
classify people into different levels. Level 1 includes people who expect that the
other players will behave randomly so they choose p ∗mean (mean = 50 if the
choice distribution is uniform), level 2 contains people who expect that the other
players’ depth of reasoning is level 1 and thus choose p2 ∗mean, . . . . Generalizing,
level K people are those who choose pK ∗mean because they believe that the other
people are at level K−1. If K is large, pK ∗mean' 0, then if we repeat the process
ad infinitum (K = ∞) we reach the theoretical solution4, 0, the highest level of
reasoning (figure 1 represents this process with p = 2/3). Random answers are
called level 0 of reasoning.
4 Although all answers (numbers) are possible game solutions (weak equilibria), if all
the subjects choose the same number, only 0 is a Nash equilibrium.
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Fig. 1 An example of different reasoning levels
Figure 2, taken from Ho et al. [1998, pg. 951], also shows the convergence
to the zero solution, but from a dominance iterative point of view5. Any number
chosen between 66.7 and 100 is dominated by 66.6 (100 ∗ 2/3, if p = 2/3), so
they say that the interval [66.7,100] corresponds to irrational behavior (R(0) for
us). Rational individuals will always choose a number in the [0,66.6] interval.
Applying the same reasoning, R(1) players will choose a number below 66.7 (but
above 44.4). Since 44.4 will again dominate any number between 44.4 and 66.7,
we say that any number below 44.4 (and above 44.4 ·2/3 = 29.6) corresponds to
a R(2) individual. Following this iterative reasoning level process ad infinitum, we
reach the theoretical Nash equilibrium (0, with R(∞)). In game theory this process
is called the iterated elimination of dominated strategies. Therefore, this game is
dominance solvable6.
10066.644.429.619.713.20
R(0)R(1)R(2)R(3)R(4)· · ·
Attraction of Equilibrium Point
Equilibrium Point
Fig. 2 Iterated reasoning of individuals eliminating dominated strategies
In very recent years some experimental researchers have opened up a new area
of investigation regarding BCG or p-beauty [see Ho et al., 1998]. After the sem-
inal papers by Nagel [1994, 1995], intensive research into BCG was begun. This
research covers many different variations of the game [see Nagel, 1998, for a sur-
vey], some of which include:
– Subject pool: sometimes subjects are students, other times professors or news-
paper readers —who presumably have different levels of education [see for
instance Bosch-Dome`nech et al., 2002].
– Payoffs: a fixed amount of money, a variable amount of money, even a present
(a beautiful pteridium aquilinum in our preliminary test or airplane tickets
Bosch-Dome`nech et al. [2002] in the case of the newspaper experiment).
5 See Rapoport and Amaldoss [2000] for an experimental study of iterative elimination
of (strongly) dominated strategies.
6 There is even a superior rationality level. An individual who knows the zero-solution
by any of these methods can guess that most people would not reach the zero solution, thus
the “intelligent” individual will link her answer to her estimation of the average rationality
level. We call this phenomenon ∞-plus reasoning level to differentiate it from those individ-
uals who find the theoretical solution, but fail to consider the importance of other people’s
decisions [see also Alba-Ferna´ndez et al., 2003].
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– Time to answer: immediate answers in the lab [Ho et al., 1998] versus long-
time answers in post-card experiments [Bosch-Dome`nech and Nagel, 1997].
– One-shot vs. repeated games [see Ho et al., 1998, Alba-Ferna´ndez et al., 2003].
– Order statistic used: usually it is the mean, but Duffy and Nagel [1997] use the
median and the maximum.
– Several feed-back learning environments [see Weber, 2003].
All these experiments bring some facts to light: individual level of reasoning
is rarely larger than 3 [see Bosch-Dome`nech et al., 2002] and Iterated Best Replay
Behavior (IBRB) is quite common [Ho et al., 1998].
3 Design, procedures and preliminaries
3.1 Design: A BCG with communication
Our experimental design expands upon the previous literature in a number of ways:
– Subjects are given a long time span to answer. Instructions were given and
explained during one normal class period. The students were then told to bring
back their answers along with a questionnaire either one, two or three weeks
later (see below for details). Although students were allowed to communicate
(freely), they were not explicitly encouraged to do so.
– Payoffs are not rival. All winners received 0.5 points towards their final grades,
regardless of how many students got the right answer.
– Mode is used as the order statistic.
As Kocher and Sutter [2001] emphasize, most papers on beauty contest games
only study individual decision making. However, considering a BCG with COM-
MUNICATION is not completely new: Kocher and Sutter [2001] have also stud-
ied interaction among individuals, although they use teams as a decision maker. In
contrast, in our experiment we let students communicate freely among themselves
and then choose their own strategy. Observe that the objective of the author above
is to test if groups learn faster than isolated individuals.
In the standard BCG, with rival payoffs, individuals have no way and no in-
centives to collude since this reduces their own probability of winning. Moreover,
when subjects value their payoffs more than those of their rivals, there is no room
for altruistic behavior [Ho et al., 1998] and all individuals have incentives to be-
tray their comrades. The only exception would be the perfect equilibrium, 0 in our
case. Note that this would mean that someone would have solved the game and
would like to share the prize with the other subject(s).
For this reason we introduce NON-RIVAL PAYOFFS. Under the assumption
that there are self-interested students, any number in the interval could be a (weak)
equilibrium. Moreover, if everyone coordinated at the same number (with costless
communication), this would imply purely collusive behavior and could be reduced
to a matching game [see Camerer, 2001].
Nevertheless, the design continues to cause certain problems since the mean
generates some noise: an individual choosing 0 may not be sure of winning be-
cause other individuals might not be intelligent enough to calculate the equilibrium
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and, therefore the order statistic could be greater than 0. The only way to ensure
victory is to have the correct information about other people’s reasoning levels.
But since this is not public information, people have to collude if they want to
ensure that they will win. The use of the MODE as the order statistic strengthens
this phenomenon, as it reduces the possible impact of an individual defection or
any other noise.
To sum up, under this BCG with mode, non-rival payoffs and costless com-
munication, if any subject knows the right answer of 0 and does not share it with
other individuals —even reducing her own probability of winning by doing so—
we could thus infer that she negatively values other subjects’ payoffs in her own
utility function. Therefore, this subject can be said to behave competitively.
Consequently, there is a unique equilibrium solution: zero. Any attempt at co-
ordination in any other number would imply both the chance of betrayal by any
individual (and the failure of the coalition) and the trembling-hand problem.
The coordination in any number different from zero can only occur if the sub-
jects are purely altruistic or, at least not-envious and that they are completely ratio-
nal who believe that the other subjects will be also perfectly rational. In contrast,
students who care about their relative position will always try to outperform the
rest of the class by choosing a smaller number. If there is at least one individual
like this, the only possible equilibrium is 0.
3.2 Procedures
The experiment was conducted in classrooms at the University of Jae´n in May
2000. The subject pool was comprised of typical university students. The date of
the experiment was selected randomly and students were given no prior notifica-
tion.
Instructions were explained aloud by the same professor in all the groups. The
same procedure was followed with all the groups:
1. Participants were asked to choose a real number in the interval [0,100].
2. The winner was the person (or persons) whose number was closest to 2/3 of
the mode of the guessed numbers.When more than one mode existed, all of
them were used to compute the different reference points and determine all the
winning numbers. The subjects were given an extra-clue: they were told that
they would realize when they reached the solution. Payoffs for all the winners
were given in the form of 0.5 extra-points towards the final grade in the courses
selected to run the experiment7.
3. Students were required to submit their choices in written form by a given date.
They were also asked to fill out a questionnaire regarding their process of rea-
soning (see appendix A.1).
Although communication was not explicitly encouraged, our time span obvi-
ously gave students the chance to communicate with each other. The total sam-
ple in our experiment was divided into three treatments according to answering
7 As we needed an academic reward for the experiment, we required the collaboration of
colleagues willing to give some extra points to the winners.
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time: one, two or three weeks. All our experimental subjects were first year un-
dergraduate students from the different schools. All the possible classifications are
summarized in Table 1.
Table 1 Experimental subjects’ features
code school time n years
B1–A Business Studies 1 week 60 5
B1–B Business Studies 2 weeks 44 5
B1–C Business Studies 3 weeks 32 5
L1 Law 1 week 11 5
A1–A Labor Affairs 1 week 44 3
A1–B Labor Affairs 2 weeks 27 3
M1–A Management 1 week 18 3
M1–B Management 2 weeks 50 3
M1–C Management 1 week 21 3
P1–A Public Administration 1 week 32 3
P1–B Public Administration 2 weeks 41 3
where code is the classroom label, school is the specific name of
the program (Spanish), time is the period given to answer, n is the
group size, and years the duration of the degree .
3.3 Preliminary test
As the mode is not usually used in BCG experiments, we performed a prelimi-
nary test to study the possible impact of this variation8. With that aim, we used
a similar design to Bosch-Dome`nech et al. [2002], but by e-mail. In this “stan-
dard” experiment, participants were colleagues from the Economics Departments
of the Universities of Jae´n, Jaume I, Vigo, Auto´noma of Barcelona and Carlos III
of Madrid9.
Figure 3 (the k value in the graph corresponds to the mean level of rationality,
see below) summarizes the results. As can be seen, the results are very similar
to those shown in the previous literature. These participants reached an average
of 34.7, that is, a k = 1 reasoning level, even though the mode was 0. Note that
since each bar of the histogram comprises an interval, the mode does not have to
coincide with the highest peak. The same applies for the rest of the figures.
Therefore, introducing the mode as the reference in a BCG without commu-
nication did not produce a significant effect on the responses. Consequently, we
8 That is, we did not allow communication.
9 By e-mail (to implicitly discourage communication), 43 unexperienced experimental
subjects were given the instructions and asked to return their responses. At the end of the
experiment, each of the five winners were ”paid” a beautiful plant.
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Fig. 3 Non-Communication BCG (k = 1)
analyzed the joint influence of the mode and communication factors in the follow-
ing.
4 Results
4.1 First analysis
In this section we will compare the data set from our (eleven) sessions. First of
all, we will show the immediate implications of allowing communication in our
experiment. Figures 4 to 13 explore the different communication games. Group
L–1 is not shown since all students chose 0. Remember that the previous figure 3
plots the non-communication game.
Initially, we can see clear differences in the dispersion of the responses. In con-
trast to the standard BCG experiments, our observations focus on some particular
number (zero or any other one) in our communication sessions.
However the average level of reasoning is not homogeneous at all! We obtain
levels from 0 to infinity:
– k = 0 for A1–B (mean 50.6),
– k = 3 for groups B1–A, B1–B and A1–A10 (means 20.6, 21.6 and 21.5, respec-
tively),
– k = 4 for P1–A (mean 12.5),
– k = 5 for B1–C and P1–B (means 8.1 and 7.7),
– k = 6 for M1–A (mean 5.0),
– k = 7 for M1–B (mean 4.2),
– kÃ ∞ for M1–C (mean 0.2) and,
– k = ∞ for L1.
Only one classroom shows a lower reasoning level than the former NCG. Note
that our NCG showed an average of 34.7, that is, a reasoning level of k = 1.
From figures 4 to 13 we can infer that students coordinate in some number and
that such a coordination leads to two different behavior patterns: i) to reach the
Nash equilibrium (zero) and ii) to get a weak equilibrium (any number different
10 Given that the coordination number was chosen randomly, this group must be properly
considered as k = 0.
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from zero). Our students coordinated in the theoretical solution in 9 out of 11
sessions and colluded in another number in the remaining 2.
First, we will analyze the behavior observed in the two classrooms in which
the participants did not collude in the Nash equilibrium. Figure 7 (A1-A group)
shows an interesting and risky behavior. One person became a “leader”. When we
went to collect the answers, she cried out “write down 22” and most of the people
followed her. Nobody noticed that 2/3 · 22 was a better option. Only two people
got the right theoretical solution, but 22 was closer to 2/3 · 22 than 0; so all the
students who said 22 won the game!
Figure 8 is even more interesting. Most of the class (25 out of 27 students)
decided to concentrate at a point (69) far from any focal position. But two people
chose (randomly) 50. Thus, they acted like involuntary “smart” traitors, thereby
winning the game. Perhaps it is even more interesting to note that the vast majority
of the sample coordinated in a dominated strategy.
Following Kocher and Sutter [2001, pg. 6], we can say that group behavior
is not necessarily better than individual behavior. They offer two reasons for this:
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first, team conformity and self-censorship in the group and, second, a tendency
to polarize individual decisions. Moreover, Weber et al. [2000] maintain that the
leadership effect depends on group size. Our results from A1–A and A1–B (Labor
Affairs) seem to confirm these ideas.
The previous findings can be summarized into two different results:
Result 1 Communication induces coordination in the responses.
But, as not all groups have improved the usual results, we can add:
Result 2 Communication per se does not guarantee an improvement in the aver-
age reasoning level.
Nevertheless, the results in most of our groups are clearly better than the usual
ones. However, when comparing the results from different sessions we observe
that Law and Management students, in this order, are the most clever. Yet Business
students (the only groups with game theory training) did not achieve good results.
Why? Could the competition level be a possible explanation?
In order to answer the above question, in the rest of the paper we will focus
on the competitive and collusive behavior shown in those groups which coordi-
nated in the theoretical Nash solution, that is, whose mode was zero. Note that the
difference between the mode and the mean precisely indicates the percentage of
population that is left out of the winning coalition.
4.2 Collusive and competitive behavior
As we noted in the previous section, when we performed the experiment students
were given a questionnaire to fill out. According to their answers, it is possible to
classify the subjects into four categories:
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Table 2 Distribution of right answers across groups
I % L % F % O % Total CI NI
B1–A 4 6.7% 6 10.0% 9 15.0% 41 68.3% 60 25.0% 16.7%
B1–B 4 9.1% 3 6.8% 11 25.0% 26 59.1% 44 31.8% 15.9%
B1–C 2 6.3% 6 18.8% 11 34.4% 13 40.6% 32 53.1% 25.0%
M1–A 0 0.0% 2 11.1% 8 44.4% 8 44.4% 18 55.6% 11.1%
M1–B 3 6.0% 4 8.0% 32 64.0% 11 22.0% 50 72.0% 14.0%
M1–C 3 14.3% 4 19.0% 13 61.9% 1 4.8% 21 81.0% 33.3%
P1–A 1 3.1% 1 3.1% 19 59.4% 11 34.4% 32 62.5% 6.3%
P1–B 4 9.8% 4 9.8% 17 41.5% 16 39.0% 41 51.2% 19.5%
L1 0 0.0% 1 9.1% 10 90.9% 0 0.0% 11 100.0% 9.1%
A1–A 2 4.5% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 42 95.5% 44 0.0% 4.5%
A1–B 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 27 100.0% 27 0.0% 0.0%
Total 23 6.1% 31 8.2% 130 34.2% 196 51.6% 380
being I: isolated, L: leaders, F: followers, O: other, CI: collusion index, NI: Nash index.
Leader (L) is the individual who guesses the right number (the perfect equilib-
rium) and shares it with other people (in our questionnaire these individuals
answered Yes to # 3 and # 5. They also gave a “correct” explanation of the
IBRB process in # 4).
Isolated (I) is the subject who does not share this information although he has
reached it (that is, # 4 was answered correctly and these individuals said Yes
in # 3, but No in # 5)
Follower (F) is the person who received the right answer from any leader (these
individuals acknowledged this fact in # 3).
Other (O) are the remaining subjects.
This information allows us to define two indexes:
Collusion Index ≡CI ≡ Leaders+Followers
Population , (1)
and,
Nash Index ≡ NI ≡ Leaders+ Isolated
Population , (2)
The first index (CI) tries to capture the degree of cooperativeness within the
population. The second index (NI) includes all the people who were able to solve
the game11. Table 2 shows the distribution of subjects according to our classifica-
tion12.
The first surprising finding is the L1 group (Law, see row 9): only one stu-
dent knew the theoretical solution, but she communicated it to everybody (she was
the leader). The rest of people simply followed her. This implies purely collu-
11 Note that this is an imperfect indicator as it is possible that a rational person who knows
the theoretical solution also recognizes that the other members follow a (wrong) leader and,
so, it is better to follow her too than to try on their own.
12 Groups A1–A and A1–B are included solely for purposes of comparison.
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sive behavior, that is, a matching game with an average reasoning level of k = ∞
(mode = mean = 0)13.
The other 8 groups (the first 8 rows in the table) correspond to those with a
zero mode and a mean greater than zero. A common feature of the 8 groups is that
there is a high percentage of students who did not guess the right answer (column
4: others): a large percentage of subjects did not win anything -except in group
M1–C in which only one person did not reach the solution. This reflects a lower
degree of cooperation among students.
Column 6 illustrates collusive behavior: M1–B, M1–C and P1–A groups show
the highest values (72%, 81%, 62.5%, respectively). Moreover, a comparison be-
tween the distribution of isolated individuals (first column) and leaders (second
column) by groups does not show systematic differences. This means that among
intelligent students we find subjects endowed with self and other-regarding prefer-
ences.
Nevertheless, a statistical analysis must be added to this preliminary descrip-
tive study in order to draw more accurate conclusions.
4.3 Meta-analysis
To analyze this data we use the meta-analysis technique. As this statistical method
is not widely known, in the appendix we have included a section dedicated to the
specific instruments used here. Remember that we will analyze only three schools:
Business, Management and Public Administration.
Table 3 shows the results from the homogeneity analysis regarding both in-
dexes (CI and NI). The first column represents the indexes as defined above; the
second column corresponds to the Q-statistic used to test general homogeneity
among groups; the third column demonstrates the probability limits of acceptance
of the null hypothesis and, finally, the last one shows if we accept the homogeneity
of the groups at a significance level of α = 0.05.
Table 3 Homogeneity tests for collusion and game theoretician indexes
Outcome measure Q statistic p-value Homogeneity
CI 54.2302 2.1177 ·10−9 No
NI 10.0572 0.1853 Yes
The first important result is that the NI index is homogeneous across the differ-
ent groups. The Q-statistic value is 10.05 and the p-value is 0.185. Therefore, with
α = .05, we ought to accept the homogeneous distribution of this index. Thus,
we conclude that the game theoretician index is the same for all the experimen-
tal sessions. Therefore, the differences observed above among groups may not be
13 It should be pointed out that this was the only group for which the subject was not
compulsory.
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explained by an unequal distribution of intelligent students. An estimation of the
average NI is yw = 0.185356, that is, approximately 18.5% of individuals are able
to reach the Nash equilibrium.
Result 3 The ability to solve complex games is equally distributed among schools.
Nevertheless, we find that there are significant differences among groups re-
garding the collusion level (CI). In particular, the value of the Q-statistic is 54.23
and the p-value 2.1177 · 10−9. So, we can conclude that the CI does not show a
homogeneous distribution among the eight groups studied. Thus, the level of col-
lusion within each group is not the same.
We will now analyze this heterogeneity in depth, taking into account features
such as (see table 1): answering time, degree, population size14 and school.
Table 4 demonstrates the results of the homogeneity analysis of CI under these
labels. The first column shows the categories of each attribute, while the second
shows the Q-statistic value of the homogeneity test. The third column illustrates the
probability limit to accept that all groups in each category are homogeneous and,
finally, we show the suitable model for each case, that is, either the fixed effects
model when homogeneity is accepted or the random effects model if homogeneity
is rejected at a significance level of α = 0.05.
Table 4 Testing homogeneity (CI) among groups by attributes.
Identification of
subpopulations Q-Statistics p-value Modelling
Time to answer
1 week
more
34.9857
18.1018
1.2267 ·10−7
4.188 ·10−4
R. E.
{
y∗w = 0.5557
σˆ2 = 0.0714
R. E.
{
y∗w = 0.5217
σˆ2 = 0.0276
Degree 3 years5 years
8.4825
7.2738
0.0754
0.0263
F. E. yw = 0.6581
R. E.
{
y∗w = 0.3544
σˆ2 = 0.013
Population size > 35≤ 35
34.8425
5.9825
1.31 ·10−7
0.1124
R. E.
{
y∗w = 0.4491
σˆ2 = 0.0463
F. E. yw = 0.6419
School
BS
M
P
7.2738
1.7294
6.5794
0.0263
0.4211
0.0103
R. E.
{
y∗w = 0.3544
σˆ2 = 0.013
F. E. yw = 0.6715
R. E.
{
y∗w = 0.6587
σˆ2 = 0.0374
First of all, we have divided the total observations into two groups according to
the time span between the instructions and the decision: one week and more than
one. In contrast to what we expected, the difference between these two subpop-
ulations is not significant. The time to answer does not have a clear influence on
14 We have labelled each group as > 35 or ≤ 35 people sample.
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the collusion level of the participants. Although there exists heterogeneity in the
collusion index within each group, the averages are very similar between them.
Therefore, we can say that the answering time does not affect the subjects’ will-
ingness to share their information with others. This would seem to suggest that
in the first week the leaders had already decided how many followers they would
share their right guess with and, after that, having more time at one’s disposal to
answer did not influence their initial behavior.
With regard to the degree programs, three-year-degree students (P1–A, P1–B,
M1–A, M1–B and M1–C) are homogeneous in their low level of collusion (0.65),
while five-year students (B1–A, B1–B, and B1–C) do not display any similarity.
Thus, as the average collusion levels indicate (0.6581 vs. 0.3544), the former are
less competitive than the latter.
If we discriminate by school, we only find homogeneity among the 3 classes
from the Management School, with a mean of 0.67. Public Administration and
Business schools are heterogeneous. Moreover, it is surprising that the average
collusion index in Business is notably lower (0.35, nearly half) than in the others.
This confirms our prior belief that the Business students are more competitive than
the other Social Sciences students in our experiment.
Result 4 Five-year-degree students are a bit more competitive than three-year-
degree students. Nonetheless, the latter are equally cooperative.
Finally, in relation to group size, the smaller groups (≤ 35) show a higher av-
erage collusion index (0.64) and homogeneity between them. However, the bigger
groups (> 35) have heterogeneous behavior, with an average lower index (0.44).
Thus, in line with Weber et al. [2000], larger size means smaller cooperation. These
results can be summarized in the following outcomes:
Result 5 Classroom size increases competitive preferences. Larger groups imply
less collusion.
Assuming costless communication, result 5 is consistent with our hypothesis
of subjects endowed with competitive other-regarding preferences. To ensure vic-
tory in a large group it is necessary to coordinate with more people. However, our
data shows that the CI is relatively small in these sessions. Therefore, this result
can only be explained under the assumption that subjects have behaved competi-
tively15.
Finally, we should add that there are competitive individuals who sometimes
prevent the correct information from reaching everyone. This behavior detracts
from the general reasoning level.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have run a modified version of the BCG standard experimental
design in order to study cooperative behavior in a classroom experiment. The set
15 Continuing with the metaphor in the introduction, if the brothers are not envious, the
best thing is to coordinate in one point. If someone is left outside the pact, it is because his
welfare is a negative argument in the other brothers’ utility function.
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of variations introduced in our experiment includes: i) the use of the mode instead
of the mean in order to reduce the effect of each individual’s guessed number,
ii) non-rival payoffs to increase individual incentives to collude, and iii) allowing
communication among participants.
This modified BCG encourages students to communicate their guessed num-
bers to each other. In order to increase the probabilities of winning, each sub-
ject will try to form the largest coalition possible, especially if subjects know the
Nash equilibrium because they may avoid possible betrayals. Hence, if any sub-
ject knows the right answer and does not share it with other individuals —even
if this means reducing her own probability of winning— we could infer that she
negatively values other subject’s payoffs in her own utility function.
Experiments were conducted in 11 classes ranging from 11 to 60 students in
size. Participants were given at least one week to submit their guesses and a ques-
tionnaire explaining their choice. Our results may be summarized as follows:
1. In contrast to the standard BCG results (guessing widespread along the inter-
val), our design with communication gives rise to a set of guessed numbers
concentrated at any point: the 0 point or any weak equilibrium.
2. In this sense, we can say that communication does not guarantee any improve-
ment in the average reasoning level. We need at least one subject who knows
the true answer and is willing to share it with other subjects.
3. The percentage of people who are willing to share information decrease with
classroom size (the larger the size, the greater the competitive behavior) and
type of school (Business students are more competitive than others).
Thus, individual incentives to communicate —to share information— are cru-
cial in order to achieve population reasoning level.
Future research lines include a laboratory experiment where communication
can be controlled as well as a comparison between rival and non-rival incentives
in our experimental framework.
A Appendix
A.1 Questionnaire
Translation of the questionnaire included on the answers sheet:
1 Name:
2 Number selected:
3 Did you make your choice on your own? Yes/No
4 If Yes, could you explain your process of reasoning?
5 Did you explain your process to anybody? How many people?
A.2 A summary of the meta-analysis method
Meta-analysis is a quantitative method used to combine and integrate the results of
several studies that share a common aspect so that they can be treated in a statistical
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manner. If by k we denote the number of experimental sessions, and pi, i = 1, ...,k
is the measure outcome, that is, the proportion of people that verifies a specific
property or adopts the behavior of interest (defined below), we can estimate each
proportion by the corresponding laboratory results.
The point estimates of the measure outcome may differ between them. This
variability can be modelled under two types of assumptions. The first assumes
that differences are due to sampling error and thus the estimated proportions are
considered to be homogeneous. This situation can be modelled by a fixed effect
model (see Glass et al. 1981 or Sutton et al. 2000).
The second model considers that the variability of the estimations exceeds the
expected sampling error, so there must be “real” and “systematic” differences be-
tween experimental sessions. This situation is modeled by a random effect model.
After deciding which approach is the most appropriate, we can draw some
general conclusions about the behavior of proportions in all the sessions.
Briefly, the fixed effect model assumes that all the experimental sessions pro-
duce the same proportion. This hypothesis can be expressed as follows:
H0 : p1 = p2 = ...= pk, (3)
In this case the estimation of the population proportion is the weighted average
given by,
yw =
k
∑
i=1
wi pi
k
∑
i=1
wi
,
where the weights are,
wi =
(
pi (1− pi)
ni
)−1
, (4)
and ni the number of subjects in the ith experimental session.
These inverse-variance weights minimize the variance of the summary esti-
mate defined as,
Var(yw) =
1
k
∑
i=1
wi
.
Hence, to test the homogeneity of the results we consider the statistic:
Q =
k
∑
i=1
wi (RDi− yw)2 . (5)
Our test of this statistic supposes that under H0, Q is approximately distributed
as a χ2 distribution with k−1 degrees of freedom. Hence, we reject H0 if the value
of Q exceeds the 1−α percentile of the corresponding χ2 distribution.
If we find heterogeneity (reject H0), the proper formulation would be the ran-
dom effect model. This assumes that proportions are randomly distributed, and
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typically follows the univariate normal distribution with unknown mean µ and vari-
ance σ2.
The estimation of the population proportion is another weighted average of the
proportions,
y∗w =
k
∑
i=1
w∗i pi
k
∑
i=1
w∗i
(6)
where the weights w∗i are based on the corresponding fixed effects weights and the
Q statistic,
w∗i =
1(
D+ 1
wi
) , (7)
where
D = max
0,
(Q− (k−1))
k
∑
i=1
wi(
k
∑
i=1
wi
)2
−
k
∑
i=1
w2i
 . (8)
The estimation of the variance σˆ2 is calculated as
σˆ2

0 if Q≤ k−1,
(Q−(k−1))
k
∑
i=1
wi( k
∑
i=1
wi
)2
−
k
∑
i=1
w2i
otherwise. (9)
Note that these weights combine the variance inter and intra studies. The vari-
ance of the weighted average is as follows
Var(y∗w) =
1
k
∑
i=1
w∗i
Hence, to test if the random effect model is appropriate to the data, we state the
null hypothesis H ′0 : σ2 = 0. Furthermore, we can see that it is equivalent to test H0
in (3).
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